Crunchy uses this format for ephemeral points in hybrid encryption.

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Extending validation of key/format parameters.

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*** Reason for rollback ***

I fixed the broken builds in AdSpam.

*** Original change description ***

Automated g4 rollback of changelist 205009482.

*** Reason for rollback ***

TAP has detected that 10 or more targets failed to build at cl/205009482.
If this is an error, please file a bug at go/autorollback-bug.
TAP checked that the following target built at cl/205009481 but failed to build at cl/205009482.
 To see all broken targets, please visit http://test/205009482.
 You can also see the results on sponge for the broken targets:
  https://sponge.corp.google.com/invocations?searchFor=label%...

***

PiperOrigin-RevId: 205080258
GitOrigin-RevId: d6c88086f1e28f0b959954330f9301da0e048d93

*** Reason for rollback ***

TAP has detected that 10 or more targets failed to build at cl/205009482.
If this is an error, please file a bug at go/autorollback-bug.
TAP checked that the following target built at cl/205009481 but failed to build at cl/205009482.
 To see all broken targets, please visit http://test/205009482.
 You can also see the results on sponge for the broken targets:
  https://sponge.corp.google.com/invocations?searchFor=label%3Atap+label%3Apostsubmit+cl%3A205009482+target%3A%2F%2Fwireless%2Fandroid%2Fapps%2Fafma%2Fsignals%2Frestricted%2Ftesting%2Fsignalchecker%3AProtoCheckerTest+TAP_BUILD_FLAGS_SUFFIX%3ACAMQBVhe
and for for previously passing target:
  https://sponge.corp.google.com/invocations?searchFor=label%3Atap+label%3Apostsubmit+cl%3A205009481+target%3A%2F%2Fwireless%2Fandroid%2Fapps%2Fafma%2Fsignals%2Frestricted%2Ftesting%2Fsignalchecker%3AProtoCheckerTest+TAP_BUILD_FLAGS_SUFFIX%3ACAMQBVhe
Questions? Comments? See the URL: go/autorollback

*** Original change description ***

Implementations of KeysetReader should always return new KeysetReader instances.

***

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It's similar to LEGACY, but it uses a randomly generated key id.

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NoExternal

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Note that C++ and Obj-C are also ready for production, also adding Haris and Charles to list of maintainers.

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GitOrigin-RevId: 9ae90e72ca30baa3e6efa9783ab8f3b7d14ec690

Also, remove stale references to v1.1.0 in TinkConfig.register() documentation.

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First, background and history:

In Java, an ECDH public key can be encoded as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo spec [1]. This spec contains the public point, and a named curve or curve parameters [2]. To test ECDH libraries, Wycheproof generates public key specs with modified curve parameters, and checks that the libraries must reject them [3].

Android M and N (and possibly other versions) do not reject said public keys specs. Given a spec Android just takes the field ID, and derives the rest of the parameters. This leads to a somewhat interesting situation: not only Android accepts Wycheproof's modified public key specs, but it also computes the shared secrets correctly and securely. So we changed Wycheproof to accept Android's behavior, and added to each test case the expected shared secret, had the public key spec not been modified.

What went wrong:

The expected shared secrets for "modified prime" and "public key of order 3" test are incorrect. I found that the public key specs (the "public" field in the ecdh_test.json) don't contain the same public point as in other tests. I'm not sure this is intentional, but because the public point is different the expected shared secret must be different too.

Let's look at test case #336. Its expected shared secret is the same as test case #335. Yet two test cases contain two different public points, as shown below (
the public point is the last BIT STRING, it starts with 04):

# Test case 335

  0 304: SEQUENCE {
  4 233:   SEQUENCE {
  7   7:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 2 1'
 16 221:     SEQUENCE {
 19   1:       INTEGER 1
 22  44:       SEQUENCE {
 24   7:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 1 1'
 33  33:         INTEGER
       :           00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
       :           00 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
       :           FF
       :         }
 68  68:       SEQUENCE {
 70  32:         OCTET STRING
       :           FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
       :           00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FC
104  32:         OCTET STRING
       :           5A C6 35 D8 AA 3A 93 E7 B3 EB BD 55 76 98 86 BC
       :           65 1D 06 B0 CC 53 B0 F6 3B CE 3C 3E 27 D2 60 4B
       :         }
138  65:       OCTET STRING
       :         04 6B 17 D1 F2 E1 2C 42 47 F8 BC E6 E5 63 A4 40
       :         F2 77 03 7D 81 2D EB 33 A0 F4 A1 39 45 D8 98 C2
       :         96 4F E3 42 E2 FE 1A 7F 9B 8E E7 EB 4A 7C 0F 9E
       :         16 2B CE 33 57 6B 31 5E CE CB B6 40 68 37 BF 51
       :         F5
205  33:       INTEGER
       :         00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
       :         FF BC E6 FA AD A7 17 9E 84 F3 B9 CA C2 FC 63 25
       :         51
       :       }
       :     }
240  66:   BIT STRING
       :     04 15 10 26 4C 18 9C 3D 52 3F F9 91 6A BD 70 69
       :     EF A6 96 8D 8D C7 DD B6 45 7D 78 69 B5 3E A6 0C
       :     DC FA FB 7E D4 78 6D A1 5D 29 EE 59 25 6F 53 6D
       :     A3 57 5A 48 88 C1 BB 0A 95 B2 56 F4 A7 E9 FD 76
       :     4A
       :   }

# Test case 336:

  0 307: SEQUENCE {
  4 236:   SEQUENCE {
  7   7:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 2 1'
 16 224:     SEQUENCE {
 19   1:       INTEGER 1
 22  44:       SEQUENCE {
 24   7:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER '1 2 840 10045 1 1'
 33  33:         INTEGER
       :           00 FD 09 10 59 A6 89 36 35 F9 00 E9 44 9D 63 F5
       :           72 B2 AE BC 4C FF 7B 4E 5E 33 F1 B2 00 E8 BB C1
       :           45
       :         }
 68  68:       SEQUENCE {
 70  32:         OCTET STRING
       :           02 F6 EF A5 59 76 C9 CB 06 FF 16 BB 62 9C 0A 8D
       :           4D 51 43 B4 00 84 B1 A1 CC 0E 4D FF 17 44 3E B7
104  32:         OCTET STRING
       :           5A C6 35 D8 AA 3A 93 E7 B3 EB BD 55 76 98 86 BC
       :           65 1D 06 B0 CC 53 B0 F6 3B CE 3C 3E 27 D2 60 4B
       :         }
138  65:       OCTET STRING
       :         04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 59 7F A9 4B
       :         1F D9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
       :         02 1B 8C 7D D7 7F 9A 95 62 79 22 EC EE FE A7 3F
       :         02 8F 1E C9 5B A9 B8 FA 95 A3 AD 24 BD F9 FF F4
       :         14
205  33:       INTEGER
       :         00 FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
       :         FF BC E6 FA AD A7 17 9E 84 F3 B9 CA C2 FC 63 25
       :         51
240   1:       INTEGER 1
       :       }
       :     }
243  66:   BIT STRING
       :     04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 59 7F A9 4B
       :     1F D9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
       :     02 1B 8C 7D D7 7F 9A 95 62 79 22 EC EE FE A7 3F
       :     02 8F 1E C9 5B A9 B8 FA 95 A3 AD 24 BD F9 FF F4
       :     14
       :   }

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.7.
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3279#section-2.3.5
[3] Many libraries don't, and usually that leads to vulnerabilities that leak the private key.

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This is necessary to use some newer functions in the upcoming RsaSignBoringSsl class.

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are usable by Obj-C code (not just tests).

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Using the latest rules_apple release fixes the previous continuous integration build failure. This is due to the inclusion of the following commit:
https://github.com/bazelbuild/rules_apple/commit/d24f9791e62ba3edcad69114fe4944e063681b39

Which is required due to a change in bazel 0.15.0. From https://github.com/bazelbuild/bazel/releases/tag/0.15.0:

"non_propagated_deps has been removed from objc_library and apple_binary."

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- Adds the ability to load a keyset from the iOS keychain.

Note 1: The part for writing a keyset to the keychain is missing because I need to make some changes to the C++ code.

Note 2: The keychain tests don't work with Bazel. I haven't figured why yet.

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